Vietnam Market Insights, AB Tower 76 Le Lai Ben Thanh Ward, Ho Chi Minh City (2026)

02/06/2026

[Market Movement]
LIQUIDITY PRESSURES DRIVE INTERBANK RATES HIGHER, LIMITING SCOPE FOR RATE CUTS
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The sharp rise in interbank rates, which briefly reached 10.5–12.5% in early June, reflects persistent liquidity pressures within the banking system. The main driver remains the widening gap between credit growth and deposit growth. As of end-April 2026, system-wide credit expanded by 4.42% YTD, significantly outpacing deposit growth of around 2.6%, forcing banks to rely more heavily on the interbank market to meet short-term funding needs.

In response, the SBV moved quickly to inject liquidity through a USD1bn swap transaction at VND23,944/USD, helping to ease immediate funding stress in the interbank market.

Earlier expectations for lower interest rates after April assuming that higher deposit rates would attract sufficient funding back into the banking system. However, deposit growth has remained weaker than anticipated, pushing the system LDR to around 115% in 1Q26 and keeping it at historical highs through April (Fig. 4). This suggests that liquidity conditions remain structurally tight despite recent policy efforts.

As a result, we believe a meaningful decline in interest rates is unlikely in the near term. While several banks have lowered deposit rates in recent months, these reductions have been driven primarily by policy guidance rather than an improvement in funding conditions. Looking ahead, we expect interest rates to gradually moderate in 2H26 as deposit growth improves and liquidity pressures ease. However, the pace of easing is likely to be modest and remain dependent on regulatory support rather than a significant improvement in underlying system liquidity.

31/05/2026

[The DMX IPO May Create More Value for DMX Than for MWG]

The market is currently approaching the Dien May Xanh (DMX) IPO with a relatively straightforward assumption: DMX lists, valuation gets unlocked, and MWG rerates higher. That reaction is understandable. Historically, subsidiary IPOs in Vietnam have often led investors to believe that hidden value inside the parent company would finally be recognized by the market.

But in MWG’s case, the more important question may not be “How much is DMX worth?” Rather, it is whether investors will still need to own MWG to gain exposure to Vietnam’s consumer electronics growth story after the IPO. That is where the real structural shift begins.

I. DMX Is No Longer Just an Electronics Retail Chain

When most investors think about the DMX IPO, they still picture a retailer selling refrigerators, washing machines, and air conditioners — a conventional consumer electronics chain tied to everyday spending demand.

In reality, after the group’s late-2025 restructuring, DMX has evolved into something much larger.

The DMX entity now consolidates five major business segments:

Dien May Xanh (DMX): the flagship consumer electronics chain with 2,008 stores, delivering +35% YoY growth in Q1/2026.
The Gioi Di D**g (TGDD): 927 ICT stores, posting +31% YoY growth over the same period.
TopZone: Vietnam’s largest Apple Authorized Retailer (AAR), operating 85 stores with +42% YoY growth and controlling roughly 50% of Apple’s market share in Vietnam.
Tho DMX: the after-sales service platform, projected to scale revenue from VND 318 billion in 2025 to VND 2,986 billion by 2028F, implying a 111% CAGR.
EraBlue Indonesia: a 45%-owned joint venture in Java, recording 100% YoY growth in Q1/2026 with 212 operating stores.

In effect, DMX represents MWG’s entire consumer electronics ecosystem being brought to market under a single listed vehicle — not simply a standalone retail chain.

That distinction is precisely why this IPO looks different from a conventional retail listing. With projected 2024–2026F EPS CAGR of 39% — nearly double the regional peer median of 26% — alongside 31% ROE versus 12.2% for peers, and a net cash balance sheet while comparable companies remain levered, DMX increasingly resembles a structurally differentiated growth platform rather than a traditional retailer.

II. What the Market Is Currently Pricing In

The market narrative today is relatively clear and internally consistent: retail demand is recovering, Apple’s product cycle is supporting ICT consumption, electronics spending is rebounding alongside GDP growth, FTSE upgrade expectations may attract ETF inflows, and the IPO could unlock valuation upside for MWG.

There is nothing inherently wrong with that framework. The issue is whether it captures the entire story.

Operationally, near-term performance remains exceptionally strong.

In Q1/2026, consolidated DMX revenue reached VND 32.6 trillion, up 34% YoY, with growth driven primarily by same-store sales rather than store expansion. NPAT rose 47% YoY to VND 2,206 billion, while net margin improved to 6.8%. EraBlue Indonesia generated IDR 906 billion in revenue, doubling YoY. Consumer finance revenue also increased roughly 50% YoY and accounted for 38% of total revenue, up from 35% in FY2025.

At the consolidated MWG level, revenue reached VND 46,462 billion (+28.6% YoY), while parent company NPAT climbed 75.6% YoY to VND 2,715 billion. Meanwhile, Bach Hoa Xanh (BHX) posted a record 2.9% net margin in Q1/2026, expanding 272bps YoY — arguably the quarter’s most important positive development.

Viewed purely through operating performance, it is difficult to construct a bearish near-term case for DMX. But that is also where the more important questions begin to emerge.

III. The IPO Could Fundamentally Change How Investors View MWG

Previously, foreign investors seeking exposure to Vietnam’s electronics retail market, Apple premiumization, or ICT consumption growth effectively had only one listed vehicle: MWG.

That dynamic created a scarcity premium. MWG benefited from being the exclusive public-market gateway into one of Southeast Asia’s most attractive consumer growth stories.

But that premium came with a trade-off. Investors wanting exposure to electronics retail also had to own the broader MWG ecosystem — including BHX, still deep in its investment cycle, An Khang, and several business lines that have yet to fully prove long-term economics. In practice, investors were required to absorb the entire ecosystem in order to access the consumer electronics story.

After the IPO, that changes materially.

For the first time, investors will be able to buy DMX directly — gaining exposure to a pure-play electronics retailer with roughly 60% ICT market share and 40% CE market share, without taking on BHX ex*****on risk.

That may ultimately become the IPO’s most important structural implication, and one the market still appears to be underestimating in its assessment of MWG.

IV. From Scarcity Premium to Holding Company Discount?

This is where current market pricing may still lack depth.

Following the IPO, MWG could increasingly be viewed less as a pure-play retail growth company and more as a holding structure. Capital market history — in Vietnam and globally — shows that holding companies rarely trade at the full NAV of their subsidiaries.

Instead, they often trade at discounts due to structural complexity, cross-capital allocation concerns, ex*****on risk, and the limited control minority shareholders have over how capital is ultimately deployed.

Relevant Precedents
- VIC (Vingroup): After VHM and VRE listed independently, investors began valuing each business separately. Rather than rerating significantly higher, VIC frequently traded at a substantial discount to NAV. The lesson was clear: subsidiary listings do not automatically rerate the parent company.

- MSN (Masan): Strong growth at MCH did not immediately translate into a corresponding rerating for MSN. The holding discount only narrowed meaningfully once Masan actively deleveraged and demonstrated clearer shareholder value realization.

- GEX (Gelex): Its diversified structure required years for investors to fully understand and trust management’s capital allocation strategy. Complexity often leads to discount — a pattern that remains remarkably consistent across markets.

Applying that framework to MWG suggests that, post-IPO, investors seeking pure-play exposure to Vietnam’s electronics retail market may increasingly choose DMX directly rather than MWG.

The scarcity premium MWG once enjoyed could gradually fade, potentially replaced by holding company discount pressure — particularly if BHX has yet to prove sustainable long-term economics.

That said, this should not be interpreted as a simplistic “DMX good, MWG bad” conclusion. The situation is considerably more nuanced. We will take a deeper look at this issue in our upcoming analysis.

25/05/2026

[Market Movement]
VIETNAM PROPOSES RAISING THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX THRESHOLD TO VND 28.6 MILLION/MONTH
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Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance has officially proposed new deductions for medical and education expenses under the draft decree guiding implementation of the 2025 Personal Income Tax Law. Under the proposal, resident taxpayers would be allowed to deduct up to VND 47 million per year for eligible healthcare and education expenses before calculating taxable income.

The deduction includes:

Up to VND 23 million/year for medical treatment and healthcare services covered by Vietnam’s public health insurance system;
Up to VND 24 million/year for tuition fees and training expenses at domestic educational institutions.

Combined with the revised standard deduction of VND 15.5 million/month for taxpayers and VND 6.2 million/month per dependent, an individual with one dependent could deduct a total of approximately VND 307.4 million/year.

As a result, individuals earning around VND 28.63 million/month would only begin paying personal income tax at the lowest 5% bracket after applying all deductions.

The draft decree is expected to take effect from July 1, while provisions related to salary and business income for resident individuals would apply from the 2026 tax year onward.

=> The proposal is estimated to reduce state budget revenue by around VND 7.7 trillion annually, but it would ease the tax burden on households, increase disposable income, and support retail consumption. This is viewed as a direct economic stimulus measure at a time when monetary easing remains constrained by inflationary pressure from raw material prices.

Positive for retail names such as FRT, MWG, and MSN.

19/05/2026

[Market movement]
Risk of capital repatriation as Japanese government bond yields hit decades’ highs
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Japanese government bond yields surged to multi-decade highs on 15 May, with the 10-year JGB yield reaching 2.73%, the highest since May 1997, and the 30-year yield crossing 4% for the first time since issuance in 1999. Markets are pricing in a 25bps BOJ rate hike to 1% at the June meeting, driven by persistent inflation expectations compounded by Iran war energy price pressures.

The move is raising concerns among investment banks about potential large-scale repatriation of Japanese capital. Japanese investors currently hold approximately USD1tn in US Treasuries, accumulated over decades of near-zero domestic rates. BlueBay CIO Mark Dowding stated that new Japanese capital is unlikely to flow into foreign assets, with domestic investment the clear preference. EPFR data showed approximately USD700mn flowed into JGB funds in March, the largest monthly inflow on record.

Analysts note that repatriation has not yet materialized at scale, as markets remain volatile and investors are cautious about continued yield increases. The 10-year JGB yield is seen reaching 3% by year-end as a realistic target. RBC Capital Markets notes Japanese investors were still net buyers of USD50bn in foreign bonds over the past 12 months despite rising domestic yields, suggesting the shift will be gradual rather than abrupt.

Source: HSC
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If you would like to discuss the thesis further, feel free to reach out. Our team is always available for deeper discussion.

12/05/2026

The Market Upgrade Era — Who Will Redefine Vietnam’s Brokerage Landscape?

“Whoever controls the deal pipeline and earns the trust of foreign investors in distribution will shape the next decade of Vietnam’s securities industry.”

Since our previous reports, the VCI story has continued to develop — and the market rarely waits for anyone.

VCI’s 2025 results largely met expectations. Revenue reached VND 4,980 billion, while pre-tax profit rose 50% YoY to VND 1,629 billion. Total assets surpassed VND 36 trillion for the first time in the company’s history, while outstanding margin loans climbed to VND 16,167 billion at year-end, up 44% in just twelve months.

At the company’s AGM on March 30, 2026, Chairwoman Nguyen Thanh Phuong expressed unusual confidence in the long-term outlook:

“The government’s commitment to macroeconomic stability and reducing corporate dependence on bank credit will create significant opportunities for Vietnam’s capital markets. Securities firms like ours still have substantial room for growth.”

Shareholders subsequently approved an aggressive 2026 business plan targeting VND 6,525 billion in revenue (+30%) and VND 2,300 billion in pre-tax profit (+41%) — the highest earnings target in nearly two decades of operations.

On April 8, 2026, FTSE Russell officially confirmed the results of its interim review — marking the final seal of approval for Vietnam's market reclassification from Frontier to Secondary Emerging Market, scheduled to take effect on September 21, 2026. Vietnamese equities will be included in FTSE Russell's global equity indices via a phased process extending into 2027, with an estimated USD 1.67 billion in passive ETF capital expected to flow in through quarterly allocations (broader estimates put total passive inflows at up to USD 6 billion). Separately, Vietnam is widely expected to be considered for MSCI's Watchlist in the June 2026 review cycle, backed by HSC Research analysis showing the market now meets 10 of MSCI's 18 accessibility criteria — a milestone that, if realized, would mark the next major step in Vietnam's global capital market integration.

Against that backdrop, VCI may be entering the most important phase of its growth story.

Capital Matters — But Ex*****on Matters More

Across the brokerage industry, the race to raise capital is now in full swing. Dozens of securities firms are expanding their balance sheets simultaneously. Charter capital alone no longer distinguishes market leaders from the rest. In theory, any firm can issue shares and raise funding.

The real differentiator — Buffett’s “economic moat” in practice — lies in the ability to deploy capital into businesses and transactions capable of generating outsized returns.

That is where VCI stands apart.

Its edge lies not only in capital strength, but in a combination of investment banking capability, international relationships, and institutional credibility — advantages built through real transactions rather than marketing narratives.

Deal History Speaks Louder Than Narratives

Looking back at 2025, VCI served as exclusive advisor for the IPO and listing of VPX (VPBank Securities), a transaction with an offering size exceeding VND 12,700 billion and an implied valuation approaching VND 64,000 billion.

The firm also acted as exclusive advisor for the IPO and listing of HPA (Hoa Phat Agriculture), valued at nearly VND 12,000 billion at IPO pricing.

These mandates were not won by chance. They reflect years of relationship-building and repeated engagement with key decision-makers across Vietnam’s largest corporate groups.

By 2026, VCI’s signed investment banking pipeline had already reached USD 400–500 million in deal value — and importantly, these are signed mandates rather than preliminary discussions.

When a securities firm combines sufficient balance sheet capacity with a proven underwriting track record, its position in negotiations changes materially. The discussion moves beyond “we will try to distribute the deal” toward “we are prepared to fully underwrite the transaction.”

For a multi-billion-dollar company preparing to go public, that distinction carries enormous weight.

Two Banking Backstops — The Financial Infrastructure Behind VCI

Within Vietnam’s financial industry, the “brokerage backed by a bank” model has become an increasingly important theme. What is less widely appreciated is that VCI effectively benefits from relationships with two banking institutions.

First is BVBank (BVB), where the connection is already well established. Nguyen Thanh Phuong currently serves as Chairwoman of the Strategy & Innovation Committee, while VCAM — a related entity — registered to purchase additional BVB shares in late 2025.

Within the broader Ban Viet ecosystem, VCI functions as the capital markets arm while BVBank serves as the banking pillar, creating a coordinated credit-and-investment platform that would be difficult for competitors outside the ecosystem to replicate.

BVBank itself is also expanding aggressively, targeting an increase in charter capital from VND 6,408 billion to nearly VND 10,000 billion in 2026. In practical terms, that means growing lending capacity across the ecosystem as well.

The second relationship revolves around the market rumors surrounding “Bank S.” Speculation suggests Nguyen Thanh Phuong could potentially join the bank’s Board of Directors. While we do not treat rumors as fact, any such development would significantly broaden VCI’s institutional support base and expand access to another large corporate client network.

These banking relationships represent far more than standby liquidity. They form part of the financial infrastructure that allows VCI to compete aggressively across margin lending, large-scale underwriting, and complex deal structuring — including against institutions backed by state-owned capital.

Our “Star of Hope”

In our view, only one competitor currently appears capable of competing with VCI on relatively equal footing: TCX (Techcom Securities).

The rationale goes beyond capital scale. TCX benefits from the backing of Techcombank, one of Vietnam’s strongest private-sector financial institutions, with substantial capabilities in fundraising, product distribution, and corporate ecosystem development.

Following its IPO, TCX has also signaled ambitions to develop a digital investment banking platform aimed at digitizing the full value chain across IPOs, M&A advisory, and bond issuance.

Even so, if forced to choose, Vietnam Market Insights would still lean toward VCI.

The reason is structural.

In the post-quantitative-easing environment, dependence on a single corporate ecosystem can become a double-edged sword. Diversification across industries, relationships, and deal pipelines tends to create greater resilience and more sustainable long-term growth — an area where VCI maintains a meaningful advantage.

The same pattern is visible in foreign institutional brokerage market share. Despite growing competition from international firms such as Yuanta and Mirae, the trio of VCI, SSI, and HCM continues to dominate foreign institutional flow.

That dominance was built over decades, long before the market upgrade narrative emerged.

“International relationships” and “political connectivity” are often used loosely in Vietnam’s financial industry. In VCI’s case, however, those relationships are visible in ex*****on. Institutions such as PYN, Apollo, Dragon Capital, and Samsung have repeatedly chosen VCI as a gateway for deploying capital into Vietnam.

Those networks were accumulated over years of transactions, credibility, and successful delivery.

As Vietnam enters the market-upgrade era and foreign capital flows accelerate, proven deal ex*****on and international connectivity may become the industry’s most valuable assets.

Final Thoughts

Vietnam’s brokerage industry has no shortage of firms with capital but limited deal flow. It also has firms with attractive mandates but insufficient balance sheet strength to commit underwriting support.

VCI now sits at a relatively rare intersection: it possesses both the core investment banking franchise and the financial resources necessary to scale it.

That is why Vietnam Market Insights continues to place its “star of hope” on VCI — not simply because the stock appears attractively valued, but because opportunities like this rarely emerge in an upgrading emerging market: a financial institution with both a proven core franchise and the balance sheet to fully capitalize on it.

If you would like to discuss the thesis further, feel free to reach out. Our team is always available for deeper discussion.

08/05/2026

[Capital Is Necessary — Investment Banking Capability Is the Real Moat]
“It is not the largest army that wins, but the most mobile, led by the most capable general.” — Napoleon

With fresh capital secured, the focus shifts to deployment—how effectively VCI can turn capital into returns.

Capital Efficiency — What ROE Tells Us

Before 2019, VCI consistently delivered ROE at 2–3x the industry level. This was driven by a top-three brokerage franchise (8–10% share) with a premium client base, proprietary trading aligned with the 2016–2018 bull market, and strong investment banking ex*****on through M&A and SOE IPOs.

Between 2020 and 2025, ROE averaged 13.85%, ahead of the industry’s 10.1%, underscoring sustained capital efficiency—even through the sector-wide tailwinds of 2020–2021. From 2022, however, returns compressed sharply—down 50.8% YoY—and fell below the industry average by 2023. The drivers were clear: intensifying competition, particularly from VPS in high-AUM retail; a 33% drawdown in the VN-Index with liquidity contracting to VND 10–15 trillion per day; and a thin investment banking pipeline amid tighter global liquidity, Fed rate hikes, foreign outflows, and lingering fallout from the Tan Hoang Minh and Van Thinh Phat bond cases.

That compression needs to be viewed in context. Even with ROE stabilizing at current levels, EPS is projected to grow at least 8.64% in 2026, supported by capital raised in the 2025 private placement. Any recovery in ROE—especially as investment banking activity normalizes—would add further upside.

As the IPO Cycle Rebuilds — VCI’s Positioning Improves

Market conditions turned more constructive in 2025, supported by policy direction targeting 8.5% GDP growth. Resolution 68-NQ-TW-2025 reinforces a structural shift: capital markets are expected to take on a larger role alongside—and partially in place of—bank financing.

Improving liquidity is already translating into deal flow.

Transactions such as TCX, VCK, and VPX have come to market, while upcoming mandates attracting attention include HPA (Hoa Phat Agriculture), Dien May Xanh, and Gelex Infrastructure. Further out, names like Bach Hoa Xanh, Highlands Coffee, and Long Chau Pharmacy point to a deeper pipeline.

At the center of this cycle is underwriting—the core of investment banking and an area where VCI retains a clear edge. Underwriting requires committing capital to absorb issuance risk and distribute securities to investors. Ex*****on risk is binary: failure at this stage can derail the entire transaction.

Economics are compelling. Fees typically range from 2–3% of proceeds for blue-chip deals and up to 5% for mid-cap transactions. Using TCX as a reference, if SSI handled 20% of a ~VND 2,164 billion offering, distribution alone could generate roughly VND 65 billion in profit. Larger allocations scale earnings accordingly, with additional upside from proprietary positioning in discounted IPO shares during the first 6–12 months post-listing.

Where Scale and Capability Meet

Dien May Xanh and HPA stand out as strategic mandates where VCI is expected to act as lead underwriter—bringing together leading corporates and top-tier intermediaries.

Unlike margin lending, where pricing drives competition, underwriting depends on credibility and balance sheet strength. High-quality issuers—particularly within ecosystems like MWG and HPG—prioritize ex*****on certainty over marginal cost differences. They tend to select partners with proven IB track records and sufficient capital to support the transaction.

In that context, VCI is typically able to retain a meaningful share of deal economics rather than distributing them widely across syndicate participants.

Big Picture

While proceeds from the 2025 private placement appear allocated to margin lending and proprietary trading, capital in practice is fungible. Once deployed, it can be rotated into underwriting and deal-related activities.

That distinction matters. Over time, it is deal-making—not margin lending—that defines the core investment thesis and underpins VCI’s competitive moat.

Short-term price action may dominate near-term narratives. Longer-term, the setup points to a cycle that is only beginning to rebuild. Follow us for upcoming insights and analysis.

22/04/2026

[PRIVATE PLACEMENT — A LONG-TERM MOVE THROUGH SHORT-TERM NOISE]
In our previous note, we discussed the market upgrade theme—a catalyst that typically draws immediate attention to brokerage stocks.

The reasoning is straightforward. When foreign capital enters a market, securities firms are among the earliest beneficiaries: client activity rises, margin lending expands, and IPO pipelines strengthen. On the surface, the entire sector stands to gain.

In reality, the picture is more nuanced. This note focuses on VCI—a stock that continues to divide opinion. Expectations around its investment banking franchise are high, yet much of that optimism has yet to be fully reflected in the share price. Here, we take a closer look at the company’s strategic direction.

“An army marches on its stomach.” — Napoleon Bonaparte

Markets often interpret price declines as a negative signal. Yet periods of volatility can also mark phases of quiet accumulation and strategic positioning. VCI appears to have gone through such a phase.

Between October 17 and November 25, 2025, following both upgrade-related developments and VCI’s announcement of a private placement equivalent to 17.64% of shares outstanding, foreign investors recorded net selling of VND 3,112 billion. The stock fell 18.47%, slightly underperforming the sector’s 15.57% decline.

Despite this drawdown, our long-term view remained unchanged. The private placement was not a sign of weakness, but a deliberate strategic move.

Subsequent developments support that view. By December 2025, the full issuance had been absorbed by 61 institutional investors, raising VND 3,953 billion. With that, VCI entered 2026 with its strongest balance sheet to date.

Why raise capital? Because scale requires capacity.

A decade ago, brokerage revenues were more balanced—split across brokerage fees, margin lending, and investment banking. The market had yet to see zero-fee competition, a surge in retail participation, or the structural disruptions that followed.

By 2024, however, the industry had evolved. Securities firms increasingly relied on margin lending and proprietary financing activities as core profit drivers, effectively extending the role of the banking system.

VCI, as a leading investment banking franchise, is well aware of this shift. Margin capacity is now essential—not only to attract brokerage clients, but also to secure corporate mandates. Without sufficient balance sheet strength, even established players risk losing ground.

At the same time, capital is critical for the next underwriting cycle. A new wave of IPOs is forming, with deal sizes expected to reach into the billions of dollars. To participate meaningfully, firms must be able to commit capital—both to support issuance and to access allocations at favorable valuations. For VCI, this has historically been a source of asymmetric returns, particularly prior to 2019.

The logic behind the VND 31,000 placement price

In December 2025, VCI issued 127.5 million shares at VND 31,000, raising approximately VND 3,953 billion. The use of proceeds was clearly defined: 80% allocated to margin lending—the core earnings engine—and 20% to proprietary trading.

Pricing was equally deliberate. Market expectations initially ranged from VND 36,000 to VND 33,000 before settling at VND 31,000. Against a market price of around VND 36,000 at the time, this represented a 13.8% discount.

Such a discount is necessary. Institutional investors will not commit to a one-year lock-up without a clear pricing advantage over the open market. Without that spread, participation would be unlikely.

At this level, the implied P/B stood at approximately 1.77x—below both the prevailing multiple of 2.05x and the five-year average of 2.22x. This created a sufficiently attractive entry point for institutional capital.

Importantly, the VND 31,000 level—equivalent to around VND 23,000 today—was more than just a pricing decision; it was central to the success of the transaction. A failure to hold this level could have undermined the deal, delayed capital plans, and impacted management credibility.

When dilution creates value

At first glance, issuing shares at a discount may appear dilutive. In this case, however, the outcome is different.

Because the issuance price exceeded book value per share (BVPS), the transaction was accretive. Our estimates suggest BVPS increased by approximately 10.8% following the placement. Assuming ROE remains around 8.83%, EPS could grow by at least 8.64% in 2026.

Private placement also provides a more targeted approach to increasing foreign ownership, allowing the company to select its investor base. This contrasts with rights issues—such as HSC’s 2:1 offering—which primarily favor existing shareholders and typically result in more limited foreign participation.

Ultimately, capital alone does not drive investor interest. Participation in this placement reflects confidence in VCI’s underlying capabilities. The company exhibits many of the characteristics of a structural leader—a point we will explore further in the next report.

Vietnam Market Insights

02/06/2026

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