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19/05/2026

[Market movement]
Risk of capital repatriation as Japanese government bond yields hit decades’ highs
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Japanese government bond yields surged to multi-decade highs on 15 May, with the 10-year JGB yield reaching 2.73%, the highest since May 1997, and the 30-year yield crossing 4% for the first time since issuance in 1999. Markets are pricing in a 25bps BOJ rate hike to 1% at the June meeting, driven by persistent inflation expectations compounded by Iran war energy price pressures.

The move is raising concerns among investment banks about potential large-scale repatriation of Japanese capital. Japanese investors currently hold approximately USD1tn in US Treasuries, accumulated over decades of near-zero domestic rates. BlueBay CIO Mark Dowding stated that new Japanese capital is unlikely to flow into foreign assets, with domestic investment the clear preference. EPFR data showed approximately USD700mn flowed into JGB funds in March, the largest monthly inflow on record.

Analysts note that repatriation has not yet materialized at scale, as markets remain volatile and investors are cautious about continued yield increases. The 10-year JGB yield is seen reaching 3% by year-end as a realistic target. RBC Capital Markets notes Japanese investors were still net buyers of USD50bn in foreign bonds over the past 12 months despite rising domestic yields, suggesting the shift will be gradual rather than abrupt.

Source: HSC
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If you would like to discuss the thesis further, feel free to reach out. Our team is always available for deeper discussion.

12/05/2026

The Market Upgrade Era — Who Will Redefine Vietnam’s Brokerage Landscape?

“Whoever controls the deal pipeline and earns the trust of foreign investors in distribution will shape the next decade of Vietnam’s securities industry.”

Since our previous reports, the VCI story has continued to develop — and the market rarely waits for anyone.

VCI’s 2025 results largely met expectations. Revenue reached VND 4,980 billion, while pre-tax profit rose 50% YoY to VND 1,629 billion. Total assets surpassed VND 36 trillion for the first time in the company’s history, while outstanding margin loans climbed to VND 16,167 billion at year-end, up 44% in just twelve months.

At the company’s AGM on March 30, 2026, Chairwoman Nguyen Thanh Phuong expressed unusual confidence in the long-term outlook:

“The government’s commitment to macroeconomic stability and reducing corporate dependence on bank credit will create significant opportunities for Vietnam’s capital markets. Securities firms like ours still have substantial room for growth.”

Shareholders subsequently approved an aggressive 2026 business plan targeting VND 6,525 billion in revenue (+30%) and VND 2,300 billion in pre-tax profit (+41%) — the highest earnings target in nearly two decades of operations.

On April 8, 2026, FTSE Russell officially confirmed the results of its interim review — marking the final seal of approval for Vietnam's market reclassification from Frontier to Secondary Emerging Market, scheduled to take effect on September 21, 2026. Vietnamese equities will be included in FTSE Russell's global equity indices via a phased process extending into 2027, with an estimated USD 1.67 billion in passive ETF capital expected to flow in through quarterly allocations (broader estimates put total passive inflows at up to USD 6 billion). Separately, Vietnam is widely expected to be considered for MSCI's Watchlist in the June 2026 review cycle, backed by HSC Research analysis showing the market now meets 10 of MSCI's 18 accessibility criteria — a milestone that, if realized, would mark the next major step in Vietnam's global capital market integration.

Against that backdrop, VCI may be entering the most important phase of its growth story.

Capital Matters — But Ex*****on Matters More

Across the brokerage industry, the race to raise capital is now in full swing. Dozens of securities firms are expanding their balance sheets simultaneously. Charter capital alone no longer distinguishes market leaders from the rest. In theory, any firm can issue shares and raise funding.

The real differentiator — Buffett’s “economic moat” in practice — lies in the ability to deploy capital into businesses and transactions capable of generating outsized returns.

That is where VCI stands apart.

Its edge lies not only in capital strength, but in a combination of investment banking capability, international relationships, and institutional credibility — advantages built through real transactions rather than marketing narratives.

Deal History Speaks Louder Than Narratives

Looking back at 2025, VCI served as exclusive advisor for the IPO and listing of VPX (VPBank Securities), a transaction with an offering size exceeding VND 12,700 billion and an implied valuation approaching VND 64,000 billion.

The firm also acted as exclusive advisor for the IPO and listing of HPA (Hoa Phat Agriculture), valued at nearly VND 12,000 billion at IPO pricing.

These mandates were not won by chance. They reflect years of relationship-building and repeated engagement with key decision-makers across Vietnam’s largest corporate groups.

By 2026, VCI’s signed investment banking pipeline had already reached USD 400–500 million in deal value — and importantly, these are signed mandates rather than preliminary discussions.

When a securities firm combines sufficient balance sheet capacity with a proven underwriting track record, its position in negotiations changes materially. The discussion moves beyond “we will try to distribute the deal” toward “we are prepared to fully underwrite the transaction.”

For a multi-billion-dollar company preparing to go public, that distinction carries enormous weight.

Two Banking Backstops — The Financial Infrastructure Behind VCI

Within Vietnam’s financial industry, the “brokerage backed by a bank” model has become an increasingly important theme. What is less widely appreciated is that VCI effectively benefits from relationships with two banking institutions.

First is BVBank (BVB), where the connection is already well established. Nguyen Thanh Phuong currently serves as Chairwoman of the Strategy & Innovation Committee, while VCAM — a related entity — registered to purchase additional BVB shares in late 2025.

Within the broader Ban Viet ecosystem, VCI functions as the capital markets arm while BVBank serves as the banking pillar, creating a coordinated credit-and-investment platform that would be difficult for competitors outside the ecosystem to replicate.

BVBank itself is also expanding aggressively, targeting an increase in charter capital from VND 6,408 billion to nearly VND 10,000 billion in 2026. In practical terms, that means growing lending capacity across the ecosystem as well.

The second relationship revolves around the market rumors surrounding “Bank S.” Speculation suggests Nguyen Thanh Phuong could potentially join the bank’s Board of Directors. While we do not treat rumors as fact, any such development would significantly broaden VCI’s institutional support base and expand access to another large corporate client network.

These banking relationships represent far more than standby liquidity. They form part of the financial infrastructure that allows VCI to compete aggressively across margin lending, large-scale underwriting, and complex deal structuring — including against institutions backed by state-owned capital.

Our “Star of Hope”

In our view, only one competitor currently appears capable of competing with VCI on relatively equal footing: TCX (Techcom Securities).

The rationale goes beyond capital scale. TCX benefits from the backing of Techcombank, one of Vietnam’s strongest private-sector financial institutions, with substantial capabilities in fundraising, product distribution, and corporate ecosystem development.

Following its IPO, TCX has also signaled ambitions to develop a digital investment banking platform aimed at digitizing the full value chain across IPOs, M&A advisory, and bond issuance.

Even so, if forced to choose, Vietnam Market Insights would still lean toward VCI.

The reason is structural.

In the post-quantitative-easing environment, dependence on a single corporate ecosystem can become a double-edged sword. Diversification across industries, relationships, and deal pipelines tends to create greater resilience and more sustainable long-term growth — an area where VCI maintains a meaningful advantage.

The same pattern is visible in foreign institutional brokerage market share. Despite growing competition from international firms such as Yuanta and Mirae, the trio of VCI, SSI, and HCM continues to dominate foreign institutional flow.

That dominance was built over decades, long before the market upgrade narrative emerged.

“International relationships” and “political connectivity” are often used loosely in Vietnam’s financial industry. In VCI’s case, however, those relationships are visible in ex*****on. Institutions such as PYN, Apollo, Dragon Capital, and Samsung have repeatedly chosen VCI as a gateway for deploying capital into Vietnam.

Those networks were accumulated over years of transactions, credibility, and successful delivery.

As Vietnam enters the market-upgrade era and foreign capital flows accelerate, proven deal ex*****on and international connectivity may become the industry’s most valuable assets.

Final Thoughts

Vietnam’s brokerage industry has no shortage of firms with capital but limited deal flow. It also has firms with attractive mandates but insufficient balance sheet strength to commit underwriting support.

VCI now sits at a relatively rare intersection: it possesses both the core investment banking franchise and the financial resources necessary to scale it.

That is why Vietnam Market Insights continues to place its “star of hope” on VCI — not simply because the stock appears attractively valued, but because opportunities like this rarely emerge in an upgrading emerging market: a financial institution with both a proven core franchise and the balance sheet to fully capitalize on it.

If you would like to discuss the thesis further, feel free to reach out. Our team is always available for deeper discussion.

08/05/2026

[Capital Is Necessary — Investment Banking Capability Is the Real Moat]
“It is not the largest army that wins, but the most mobile, led by the most capable general.” — Napoleon

With fresh capital secured, the focus shifts to deployment—how effectively VCI can turn capital into returns.

Capital Efficiency — What ROE Tells Us

Before 2019, VCI consistently delivered ROE at 2–3x the industry level. This was driven by a top-three brokerage franchise (8–10% share) with a premium client base, proprietary trading aligned with the 2016–2018 bull market, and strong investment banking ex*****on through M&A and SOE IPOs.

Between 2020 and 2025, ROE averaged 13.85%, ahead of the industry’s 10.1%, underscoring sustained capital efficiency—even through the sector-wide tailwinds of 2020–2021. From 2022, however, returns compressed sharply—down 50.8% YoY—and fell below the industry average by 2023. The drivers were clear: intensifying competition, particularly from VPS in high-AUM retail; a 33% drawdown in the VN-Index with liquidity contracting to VND 10–15 trillion per day; and a thin investment banking pipeline amid tighter global liquidity, Fed rate hikes, foreign outflows, and lingering fallout from the Tan Hoang Minh and Van Thinh Phat bond cases.

That compression needs to be viewed in context. Even with ROE stabilizing at current levels, EPS is projected to grow at least 8.64% in 2026, supported by capital raised in the 2025 private placement. Any recovery in ROE—especially as investment banking activity normalizes—would add further upside.

As the IPO Cycle Rebuilds — VCI’s Positioning Improves

Market conditions turned more constructive in 2025, supported by policy direction targeting 8.5% GDP growth. Resolution 68-NQ-TW-2025 reinforces a structural shift: capital markets are expected to take on a larger role alongside—and partially in place of—bank financing.

Improving liquidity is already translating into deal flow.

Transactions such as TCX, VCK, and VPX have come to market, while upcoming mandates attracting attention include HPA (Hoa Phat Agriculture), Dien May Xanh, and Gelex Infrastructure. Further out, names like Bach Hoa Xanh, Highlands Coffee, and Long Chau Pharmacy point to a deeper pipeline.

At the center of this cycle is underwriting—the core of investment banking and an area where VCI retains a clear edge. Underwriting requires committing capital to absorb issuance risk and distribute securities to investors. Ex*****on risk is binary: failure at this stage can derail the entire transaction.

Economics are compelling. Fees typically range from 2–3% of proceeds for blue-chip deals and up to 5% for mid-cap transactions. Using TCX as a reference, if SSI handled 20% of a ~VND 2,164 billion offering, distribution alone could generate roughly VND 65 billion in profit. Larger allocations scale earnings accordingly, with additional upside from proprietary positioning in discounted IPO shares during the first 6–12 months post-listing.

Where Scale and Capability Meet

Dien May Xanh and HPA stand out as strategic mandates where VCI is expected to act as lead underwriter—bringing together leading corporates and top-tier intermediaries.

Unlike margin lending, where pricing drives competition, underwriting depends on credibility and balance sheet strength. High-quality issuers—particularly within ecosystems like MWG and HPG—prioritize ex*****on certainty over marginal cost differences. They tend to select partners with proven IB track records and sufficient capital to support the transaction.

In that context, VCI is typically able to retain a meaningful share of deal economics rather than distributing them widely across syndicate participants.

Big Picture

While proceeds from the 2025 private placement appear allocated to margin lending and proprietary trading, capital in practice is fungible. Once deployed, it can be rotated into underwriting and deal-related activities.

That distinction matters. Over time, it is deal-making—not margin lending—that defines the core investment thesis and underpins VCI’s competitive moat.

Short-term price action may dominate near-term narratives. Longer-term, the setup points to a cycle that is only beginning to rebuild. Follow us for upcoming insights and analysis.

22/04/2026

[PRIVATE PLACEMENT — A LONG-TERM MOVE THROUGH SHORT-TERM NOISE]
In our previous note, we discussed the market upgrade theme—a catalyst that typically draws immediate attention to brokerage stocks.

The reasoning is straightforward. When foreign capital enters a market, securities firms are among the earliest beneficiaries: client activity rises, margin lending expands, and IPO pipelines strengthen. On the surface, the entire sector stands to gain.

In reality, the picture is more nuanced. This note focuses on VCI—a stock that continues to divide opinion. Expectations around its investment banking franchise are high, yet much of that optimism has yet to be fully reflected in the share price. Here, we take a closer look at the company’s strategic direction.

“An army marches on its stomach.” — Napoleon Bonaparte

Markets often interpret price declines as a negative signal. Yet periods of volatility can also mark phases of quiet accumulation and strategic positioning. VCI appears to have gone through such a phase.

Between October 17 and November 25, 2025, following both upgrade-related developments and VCI’s announcement of a private placement equivalent to 17.64% of shares outstanding, foreign investors recorded net selling of VND 3,112 billion. The stock fell 18.47%, slightly underperforming the sector’s 15.57% decline.

Despite this drawdown, our long-term view remained unchanged. The private placement was not a sign of weakness, but a deliberate strategic move.

Subsequent developments support that view. By December 2025, the full issuance had been absorbed by 61 institutional investors, raising VND 3,953 billion. With that, VCI entered 2026 with its strongest balance sheet to date.

Why raise capital? Because scale requires capacity.

A decade ago, brokerage revenues were more balanced—split across brokerage fees, margin lending, and investment banking. The market had yet to see zero-fee competition, a surge in retail participation, or the structural disruptions that followed.

By 2024, however, the industry had evolved. Securities firms increasingly relied on margin lending and proprietary financing activities as core profit drivers, effectively extending the role of the banking system.

VCI, as a leading investment banking franchise, is well aware of this shift. Margin capacity is now essential—not only to attract brokerage clients, but also to secure corporate mandates. Without sufficient balance sheet strength, even established players risk losing ground.

At the same time, capital is critical for the next underwriting cycle. A new wave of IPOs is forming, with deal sizes expected to reach into the billions of dollars. To participate meaningfully, firms must be able to commit capital—both to support issuance and to access allocations at favorable valuations. For VCI, this has historically been a source of asymmetric returns, particularly prior to 2019.

The logic behind the VND 31,000 placement price

In December 2025, VCI issued 127.5 million shares at VND 31,000, raising approximately VND 3,953 billion. The use of proceeds was clearly defined: 80% allocated to margin lending—the core earnings engine—and 20% to proprietary trading.

Pricing was equally deliberate. Market expectations initially ranged from VND 36,000 to VND 33,000 before settling at VND 31,000. Against a market price of around VND 36,000 at the time, this represented a 13.8% discount.

Such a discount is necessary. Institutional investors will not commit to a one-year lock-up without a clear pricing advantage over the open market. Without that spread, participation would be unlikely.

At this level, the implied P/B stood at approximately 1.77x—below both the prevailing multiple of 2.05x and the five-year average of 2.22x. This created a sufficiently attractive entry point for institutional capital.

Importantly, the VND 31,000 level—equivalent to around VND 23,000 today—was more than just a pricing decision; it was central to the success of the transaction. A failure to hold this level could have undermined the deal, delayed capital plans, and impacted management credibility.

When dilution creates value

At first glance, issuing shares at a discount may appear dilutive. In this case, however, the outcome is different.

Because the issuance price exceeded book value per share (BVPS), the transaction was accretive. Our estimates suggest BVPS increased by approximately 10.8% following the placement. Assuming ROE remains around 8.83%, EPS could grow by at least 8.64% in 2026.

Private placement also provides a more targeted approach to increasing foreign ownership, allowing the company to select its investor base. This contrasts with rights issues—such as HSC’s 2:1 offering—which primarily favor existing shareholders and typically result in more limited foreign participation.

Ultimately, capital alone does not drive investor interest. Participation in this placement reflects confidence in VCI’s underlying capabilities. The company exhibits many of the characteristics of a structural leader—a point we will explore further in the next report.

15/04/2026

[Vietnam’s Market Upgrade: What Will Bring Foreign Capital Back—and Keep It There]
I. When History Rhymes: The Pre-Upgrade Rally
Across global markets, upgrades in classification tend to follow a familiar pattern: a strong rally builds ahead of the official announcement. Vietnam has followed that script.

Despite narrow market breadth—where gains were largely concentrated in the Vingroup ecosystem—the VN-Index still climbed roughly 40% in the six months leading up to the upgrade announcement.

Since then, the picture has shifted. The market has moved into a post-upgrade correction, with net foreign outflows totaling about USD 2.39 billion since October 2025.

This isn’t unusual. In many cases, the pre-upgrade rally is when most profits are made. By the time the event arrives, the trade has largely played out. What follows is less about chasing upside and more about repositioning portfolios.

II. What Comes After the Announcement?
From the upgrade announcement through April 2026—and looking ahead to the October review—the market is dealing with two overlapping forces.

- The first is profit-taking from early entrants, including institutional investors and “smart money” that positioned well ahead of the upgrade narrative.

- The second is portfolio rebalancing across both active and passive funds.

These flows behave very differently. They operate on separate timelines, respond to different signals, and serve different objectives. Lumping them together under the umbrella of “foreign capital” often leads to misleading conclusions about market direction.

III. ETF Flows: Important, but Not the Full Story
Much of the market’s attention has centered on ETF inflows, with expectations of billions of dollars entering through index rebalancing. That narrative has become a key pillar of bullish sentiment.

But it only tells part of the story.

ETF flows, while relatively predictable, are limited in scale. They likely account for just 20–30% of foreign financial investor activity—equivalent to less than 1% of total market capitalization. Active investors still drive the bigger picture.

There’s also an important timing dynamic. ETF investors aren’t obligated to wait for the official rebalancing date. In practice, many reduce exposure once expectations are fully priced in. If selling pressure builds ahead of the event, funds may face redemptions—a pattern seen in other frontier markets where passive outflows preceded active inflows.

ETFs play a role in the upgrade process, but they don’t create market depth on their own. That depends on sustained participation from long-term foreign investors, both strategic and financial.

IV. Foreign Outflows: Nearing a Natural Limit
Foreign financial ownership has been steadily unwound over the past decade—arguably to the point of exhaustion.In 2016–2017, this cohort accounted for roughly 9.5–10.2% of market capitalization. By 2025, that had fallen to just 2.7%, implying that nearly three-quarters of positions have been liquidated in less than ten years. Net outflows accelerated in parallel, rising from USD 0.4 billion in 2019 to nearly USD 4.7 billion in 2025.

At this stage, technical selling pressure from foreign financial investors looks largely depleted. Not due to a shift in conviction, but because positioning has already been materially reduced.

That said, the end of selling doesn’t automatically bring buyers back. The more persistent issue has been structural. For years, Vietnam has struggled to offer enough scale, depth, and investable ideas for institutional investors to build meaningful positions without running into liquidity constraints.

So what would bring capital back?

Historically, institutional inflows tend to return when several conditions align:

- Macroeconomic stability: Vietnam remains one of the stronger performers among emerging markets, with GDP growth of 7–8%, controlled inflation, a stable currency, and PMI consistently in expansion.

- Market infrastructure: Reforms are progressing, but not complete. The removal of pre-funding requirements in late 2024 was a key step. However, the absence of a central counterparty clearing (CCP) system—expected no earlier than Q1 2027—remains a constraint, particularly for large institutional funds.

- Index classification: FTSE’s upgrade, approved in October 2025 and set for implementation in September 2026, is largely priced in. MSCI, however, still classifies Vietnam as a frontier market, with a potential upgrade review in 2027. This staggered timeline suggests two distinct waves of inflows, each with different characteristics.

- Policy direction: Following the 2025 leadership transition, policy signals have become more reform-oriented, particularly around economic modernization. While harder to quantify, this shift matters for long-term capital.

- Valuation and earnings: The market trades at around 14.9x P/E, above the emerging market average of ~12x. However, this is supported by earnings growth of roughly 20% CAGR over the past three years and expectations of broader recovery in 2026.

- Global backdrop: External risks remain. Tensions in the Middle East and disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz have pushed up energy costs—posing challenges for import-dependent economies like Vietnam. At the same time, supply chain diversification under the China+1 strategy continues to benefit the country structurally.

Within this context, names like HPG, MWG, CTG, and VCI stand out. They combine exposure to structural growth trends with business models that are easier for international investors to underwrite.

V. The Real Test: Getting Capital to Stay
Bringing foreign capital back is one challenge. Keeping it there is another.

In the near term, re-entry depends largely on macro stability and the availability of investable opportunities. Vietnam scores well on the former but still has work to do on the latter.

The market remains heavily concentrated in financials and real estate, limiting diversification for institutional portfolios. Investors are increasingly selective, focusing on companies with durable earnings, strong cash flows, disciplined leverage, and reasonable valuations. The number of such opportunities remains relatively limited.

Longer term, retention comes down to governance. Transparency, accountability, and minority shareholder protection are critical. These are not quick fixes—they require sustained effort from both regulators and corporate management.

As the initial excitement around the upgrade fades, fundamentals will take center stage. Ultimately, it is the quality of Vietnam’s listed companies that will determine whether foreign capital returns—and whether it stays.

If you’re looking to identify high-quality investment opportunities in this evolving market, our team is available to discuss further.

05/04/2026

[HORMUZ — THE GLOBAL UREA CHOKEPOINT]
A 21-mile stretch around Hormuz determines food security thousands of miles away—~30% of global urea trade flows through this corridor, with no viable alternative.

Hormuz is often labeled the “oil chokepoint,” but that captures only part of the picture. According to the IEA, over 30% of global urea trade, along with ~20% of ammonia and phosphate, transits this route. With no alternative shipping lanes, any disruption becomes systemic, with no buffer or offset.

While Saudi Arabia can reroute crude via Red Sea pipelines, no equivalent infrastructure exists for ammonia or urea. Given their specialized logistics, VLGC ammonia carriers and urea bulk vessels have limited rerouting flexibility. A closure of Hormuz would effectively halt nearly one-third of global fertilizer trade flows.

What follows is a four-layer cascading disruption, where each layer amplifies the previous one.

Layer 1: Direct supply shock — ~30–35% of global urea trade is disrupted at source. Key export hubs fully reliant on Hormuz include Qatar (~5 mtpa), Iran (~5.5 mtpa), UAE (~2 mtpa), Bahrain (~0.75 mtpa), Eastern Saudi Arabia (~2 mtpa), and Oman (~3 mtpa). In aggregate, nearly one-third of global export supply is stranded, with no viable alternatives.

Layer 2: Production disruptions — Beyond logistics, production itself is impaired. Qatar’s Ras Laffan—the world’s largest LNG hub—has been offline since March 2, 2026. LNG disruptions from Qatar and the UAE have removed ~300 million m³/day of supply (~2 bcm/week). At the same time, key energy nodes—Ras Tanura (Saudi Arabia), Ruwais (UAE), and facilities in Kuwait—have either shut down or cut output, tightening feedstock gas supply across the regional urea chain.

Layer 3: Cross-border spillover — often overlooked, this layer explains much of the gap between the direct disruption (30–35%) and our ~45% total impact estimate. The shock extends into gas-dependent economies.

In India, IFFCO (~4.2 mtpa), reliant on ~60% LNG from Qatar, has been forced to cut output. Gas supply to the fertilizer sector has dropped to ~70% of normal levels, reducing domestic production by at least 800 kt per month. In Bangladesh, 5 of 6 urea plants (~2.8 mtpa) have shut due to gas shortages. Egypt—exporting 3.5–4 mtpa, mainly to the EU—has also seen widespread disruptions after losing Israeli gas supply.

At this point, the disruption has become transcontinental.
Layer 4: Price repricing via marginal cost dynamics — European TTF gas has surged above €65/MWh in early March, up >50% from pre-conflict levels. As European costs—the global pricing anchor—rise, the entire urea cost curve shifts higher.

Why this is more severe than the 2022 Ukraine shock

First, breadth of impact: The Russia–Ukraine shock primarily affected one major supplier. This crisis hits multiple suppliers simultaneously—from the Middle East (Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Oman), to gas-dependent importers (India, Bangladesh, Egypt), and European producers facing surging gas costs.

Second, lack of substitutes: In 2022, the Middle East filled the gap left by Russia. This time, that replacement source is now constrained. China is prioritizing domestic demand, with urea exports unlikely to resume before May, while Russian plants are already near full capacity.

Third, timing and inventory constraints: A Gulf-to-U.S. shipment takes ~30 days, meaning current disruptions miss the March–April planting season. More critically, unlike oil, the fertilizer market lacks a coordinated global strategic reserve system, making supply shocks significantly harder to manage.

As of March 31, 2026, granular urea prices have risen 37% in one month to $665/ton. According to Oxford Economics’ Alpine Macro, urea and ammonia prices have increased ~50% and ~20%, respectively, since the conflict began.

Amid rising volatility, two Vietnamese pure-play producers are particularly well positioned to benefit. We will analyze these names in subsequent reports.

If you want a deeper dive into specific stocks or portfolio impacts, our team is ready to discuss.

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