বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক নিরাপত্তা নেটওয়ার্ক

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বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক নিরাপত্তা নেটওয়ার্ক Contact information, map and directions, contact form, opening hours, services, ratings, photos, videos and announcements from বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক নিরাপত্তা নেটওয়ার্ক, Financial aid service, Dhaka.

বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক নিরাপত্তা নেটওয়ার্ক একটি অলাভজনক উদ্যোগ, যা ব্যক্তিগত ও পারিবারিক জীবনে অনলাইন জুয়া ও অবৈধ বাজির কারণে সৃষ্ট ভয়াবহ আর্থিক ও সামাজিক ক্ষতি থেকে মানুষকে রক্ষা করার জন্য নিবেদিত।

সাম্প্রতিক সময়ে আমাদের কাছে bKash সংক্রান্ত অসংখ্য অভিযোগ আসছে সাধারণ গ্রাহক, ব্যবসায়ী এবং এজেন্টদের কাছ থেকে।অভিযোগগু...
28/08/2026

সাম্প্রতিক সময়ে আমাদের কাছে bKash সংক্রান্ত অসংখ্য অভিযোগ আসছে সাধারণ গ্রাহক, ব্যবসায়ী এবং এজেন্টদের কাছ থেকে।

অভিযোগগুলোর মধ্যে একটি বিষয় বারবার উঠে আসছে। কোনো পূর্ব সতর্কতা ছাড়াই ব্যক্তিগত বা ব্যবসায়িক অ্যাকাউন্ট, Merchant SIM অথবা গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সেবা যেমন NPSB ও bKash-to-Bank বন্ধ বা সীমাবদ্ধ হয়ে যাচ্ছে। অনেক গ্রাহক জানাচ্ছেন, তারা স্পষ্ট কারণ বা লিখিত ব্যাখ্যা পাচ্ছেন না এবং কার্যকরভাবে আপিল বা পুনর্বিবেচনার সুযোগ পেতেও সমস্যার সম্মুখীন হচ্ছেন।

কিছু মানুষ মাসের পর মাস, এমনকি বছরের পর বছর ধরে সমাধানের অপেক্ষায় রয়েছেন। অনেক ক্ষেত্রে অ্যাকাউন্টে থাকা অর্থও ব্যবহার করা সম্ভব হচ্ছে না।

আমরা মনে করি, প্রতারণা, জালিয়াতি এবং আইনবিরোধী কার্যক্রম বন্ধ করতে কঠোর ব্যবস্থা অবশ্যই প্রয়োজন। তবে একই সঙ্গে কোনো নিরপরাধ নাগরিক, বৈধ ব্যবসায়ী বা এজেন্ট যেন ভুলভাবে ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত না হন, সেটিও সমান গুরুত্বপূর্ণ।

এই বিষয়টি নিয়ে আমরা bKash Limited এবং Bangladesh Bank-এর কাছে আনুষ্ঠানিকভাবে অভিযোগ ও উদ্বেগ জানিয়েছি। আমরা আশা করি, সংশ্লিষ্ট কর্তৃপক্ষ বিষয়টি গুরুত্বের সঙ্গে পর্যালোচনা করবেন এবং গ্রাহকদের জন্য আরও স্বচ্ছ নীতিমালা, স্পষ্ট কারণ জানানোর ব্যবস্থা এবং কার্যকর পুনর্বিবেচনা ও অ্যাকাউন্ট পুনরুদ্ধার প্রক্রিয়া নিশ্চিত করবেন।

আপনার bKash অ্যাকাউন্ট বা ব্যবসায়িক অ্যাকাউন্টও যদি অন্যায়ভাবে ব্লক বা সীমাবদ্ধ করা হয়ে থাকে, তাহলে প্রথমে bKash-এর অফিসিয়াল চ্যানেল ব্যবহার করে অভিযোগ জানান।

bKash Customer Care: 16247
Email: [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
bKash Care

সমাধান না হলে বাংলাদেশ ব্যাংকের CIPC-তেও অভিযোগ করা যেতে পারে:

Email: [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
Hotline: 16236

এছাড়াও আপনার অভিজ্ঞতা আমাদের কাছে বিস্তারিতভাবে জানাতে পারেন। আমরা এ ধরনের অভিযোগ সংগ্রহ করছি এবং প্রাপ্ত তথ্য যথাযথ কর্তৃপক্ষের কাছে তুলে ধরার উদ্যোগ নিচ্ছি।

আপনার অভিযোগে অনুগ্রহ করে কী ঘটেছে, কখন অ্যাকাউন্ট ব্লক বা সীমাবদ্ধ হয়েছে, bKash-এর সঙ্গে আগে যোগাযোগ করেছেন কি না এবং কোনো Complaint Reference Number থাকলে সেটিও উল্লেখ করুন।

শুধুমাত্র প্রকৃত এবং অন্যায়ভাবে ব্লক বা সীমাবদ্ধ হওয়া অ্যাকাউন্টের ক্ষেত্রে আমাদের সঙ্গে যোগাযোগ করার অনুরোধ করছি।

bKash Limited Bangladesh Bank-The Central Bank of Bangladesh

আপনার bKash অ্যাকাউন্ট কি অন্যায়ভাবে ব্লক করা হয়েছে?আপনার ব্যক্তিগত বা ব্যবসায়িক bKash অ্যাকাউন্ট যদি কোনো বৈধ কারণ ছ...
26/08/2026

আপনার bKash অ্যাকাউন্ট কি অন্যায়ভাবে ব্লক করা হয়েছে?

আপনার ব্যক্তিগত বা ব্যবসায়িক bKash অ্যাকাউন্ট যদি কোনো বৈধ কারণ ছাড়াই ব্লক, সীমাবদ্ধ বা স্থগিত করা হয়ে থাকে এবং আপনি মনে করেন যে এই ব্লকটি অন্যায়ভাবে করা হয়েছে, তাহলে আমরা আপনার বিষয়টি পর্যালোচনা করতে এবং সম্ভব হলে অ্যাকাউন্ট আনব্লক করার বিষয়ে আইনি সহায়তা করতে প্রস্তুত।

আমরা যেন আপনার পরিস্থিতি বুঝতে পারি, অনুগ্রহ করে বিস্তারিতভাবে জানান:

• কখন এবং কী পরিস্থিতিতে আপনার অ্যাকাউন্ট ব্লক করা হয়েছে
• bKash থেকে আপনি কী কারণ বা নোটিশ পেয়েছেন
• আপনি আগে bKash কাস্টমার সাপোর্টে যোগাযোগ করেছিলেন কি না
• সেখানে কী উত্তর পেয়েছেন
• কোন লেনদেন বা অর্থ আপনার অ্যাকাউন্টে আটকে আছে
• পরিস্থিতি বোঝার জন্য প্রয়োজনীয় অন্য কোনো তথ্য

এর পাশাপাশি আপনার ফোন নম্বর বা যোগাযোগের জন্য অন্য কোনো সুবিধাজনক মাধ্যম অবশ্যই রেখে দিন।

অনুগ্রহ করে শুধুমাত্র তখনই আমাদের সঙ্গে যোগাযোগ করুন, যখন আপনি সত্যিই মনে করেন যে bKash আপনার অ্যাকাউন্ট অন্যায়ভাবে ব্লক করেছে।

আপনার দেওয়া তথ্য আমরা পর্যালোচনা করব এবং পরিস্থিতিতে সত্যিই হস্তক্ষেপের প্রয়োজন হলে, অ্যাকাউন্ট পুনরুদ্ধার ও আনব্লক করার জন্য আইনি যোগাযোগ এবং প্রক্রিয়ায় আপনাকে সহায়তা করার চেষ্টা করব।

বাংলাদেশে পেমেন্ট গ্রুপগুলোর মধ্যে শুরু হয়েছে নতুন সংঘাত: চীনা অপারেটররা স্থানীয় অ্যাকাউন্ট মালিকদের বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগ ব...
25/08/2026

বাংলাদেশে পেমেন্ট গ্রুপগুলোর মধ্যে শুরু হয়েছে নতুন সংঘাত: চীনা অপারেটররা স্থানীয় অ্যাকাউন্ট মালিকদের বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগ ব্যবহার করছে

চীনা GAMBLING নেটওয়ার্কগুলো বাংলাদেশিদের ব্যবহার করছে আর্থিক অবকাঠামোর অংশ হিসেবে

বিদেশি সংগঠকরা আড়ালে থাকে, কিন্তু দায়ভার বহন করেন স্থানীয় মানুষ

গত কয়েক মাসে বাংলাদেশে অনলাইন জুয়া, অবৈধ পেমেন্ট নেটওয়ার্ক এবং স্থানীয় আর্থিক অবকাঠামো ব্যবহারের বিরুদ্ধে আইনশৃঙ্খলা বাহিনী ব্যাপক অভিযান পরিচালনা করছে।

আইনশৃঙ্খলা বাহিনীর বিভিন্ন তদন্তে bKash, Nagad, Rocket এবং Upay অ্যাকাউন্ট, ব্যাংক অ্যাকাউন্ট, হাজার হাজার SIM কার্ড এবং gambling প্ল্যাটফর্মের সঙ্গে যুক্ত পেমেন্ট কাঠামোর তথ্য সামনে এসেছে। কিছু তদন্তে চীনা নাগরিকদের নামও উঠে এসেছে, যাদের এসব নেটওয়ার্ক পরিচালনার সঙ্গে যুক্ত থাকার অভিযোগ করা হয়েছে।

তবে gambling নেটওয়ার্কের বিরুদ্ধে অভিযানের পাশাপাশি আরেকটি সমস্যাও সামনে আসছে — এই ছায়া পেমেন্ট বাজারের অভ্যন্তরীণ সংঘাত।

বাজারের সঙ্গে যুক্ত কিছু ব্যক্তির বক্তব্য অনুযায়ী, কিছু ক্ষেত্রে চীনা অপারেটররা তাদের সাবেক সহযোগী, এজেন্ট বা অ্যাকাউন্ট মালিকদের বিরুদ্ধে আইনগত অভিযোগকে চাপ সৃষ্টির মাধ্যম হিসেবে ব্যবহার করছে, বিশেষ করে যারা সহযোগিতা বন্ধ করে দিতে চায় বা এই নেটওয়ার্ক থেকে বেরিয়ে আসতে চায়।

যারা আগে সরবরাহ করেছিল:

• bKash/Nagad/Rocket/Upay অ্যাকাউন্ট
• ব্যাংক অ্যাকাউন্ট
• SIM কার্ড
• পেমেন্ট এজেন্ট প্রোফাইল

তারা পরবর্তীতে বিরোধের কারণে নিজেরাই অভিযোগ, তদন্ত বা আইনি সমস্যার মুখোমুখি হতে পারে।

এর ফলে এমন একটি পরিস্থিতি তৈরি হচ্ছে যেখানে একই অবৈধ অর্থনৈতিক ব্যবস্থার অংশগ্রহণকারীরা একে অপরের বিরুদ্ধে রাষ্ট্রের আইন প্রয়োগকারী ব্যবস্থাকে ব্যবহার করছে।

সবচেয়ে বড় সমস্যা হলো, প্রকৃত সংগঠকরা প্রায়ই এই চেইনের অনেক উপরের স্তরে অবস্থান করে।

তারা নিয়ন্ত্রণ করতে পারে:

• পেমেন্ট প্রবাহ
• ক্রিপ্টোকারেন্সি ওয়ালেট
• প্রযুক্তিগত অবকাঠামো
• একাধিক পেমেন্ট ব্র্যান্ড

কিন্তু তদন্ত শুরু হলে প্রথম আঘাত আসে স্থানীয় অ্যাকাউন্ট মালিকদের ওপর।

কারণ:

অ্যাকাউন্টটি তাদের নামে নিবন্ধিত।

SIM কার্ড তাদের পরিচয়ের সঙ্গে যুক্ত।

ব্যাংক ও MFS প্রতিষ্ঠানের কাছে তাদের তথ্য রয়েছে।

ফলে বাংলাদেশি নাগরিকরাই এই পুরো ব্যবস্থার সবচেয়ে দুর্বল অংশে পরিণত হয়।

গত কয়েক মাসে বাংলাদেশ পুলিশ এমন একাধিক নেটওয়ার্ক উন্মোচন করেছে যেখানে হাজার হাজার SIM কার্ড এবং বড় পরিমাণ আর্থিক লেনদেনের তথ্য পাওয়া গেছে। একটি অভিযানে প্রায় ৬,৬০০টি MFS-সংযুক্ত SIM কার্ড পাওয়া যায় এবং তদন্তকারীরা বিদেশে অর্থ স্থানান্তরের জন্য ক্রিপ্টোকারেন্সি ব্যবহারের কথা উল্লেখ করেন।

সমস্যাটি এখন শুধু অনলাইন জুয়ার মধ্যে সীমাবদ্ধ নেই।

এটি পরিণত হচ্ছে পেমেন্ট অবকাঠামোর নিয়ন্ত্রণ নিয়ে একটি সংঘাতে, যেখানে বিভিন্ন গ্রুপ নিজেদের স্বার্থ রক্ষা করতে প্রতিযোগিতা করছে, কিন্তু সবচেয়ে বেশি ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত হচ্ছে সাধারণ অ্যাকাউন্ট মালিকরা।

বিদেশি অপারেটররা যখন বাজার ছেড়ে চলে যায় বা তাদের কাঠামো পরিবর্তন করে, তখন স্থানীয় মানুষ থেকে যায়:

• বন্ধ হওয়া অ্যাকাউন্ট নিয়ে
• তদন্তের মুখোমুখি হয়ে
• আইনি ঝুঁকি নিয়ে

এই ব্যবস্থায় সবচেয়ে গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সম্পদ শুধু অর্থ নয়।

সবচেয়ে বড় সম্পদ হলো মানুষ, তাদের পরিচয়, তাদের SIM কার্ড এবং তাদের আর্থিক অ্যাকাউন্ট।

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN BANGLADESH LAUNCH CRACKDOWN ON CHINESE-LINKED GAMBLING NETWORKSCHINESE OPERATORS USE BANGLADES...
22/08/2026

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN BANGLADESH LAUNCH CRACKDOWN ON CHINESE-LINKED GAMBLING NETWORKS

CHINESE OPERATORS USE BANGLADESHI CITIZENS AS FINANCIAL TOOLS FOR SHADOW OPERATIONS

CHINESE ORGANIZERS REMAIN IN THE SHADOWS WHILE LOCAL PEOPLE FACE THE CONSEQUENCES

In recent months, law-enforcement agencies in Bangladesh have launched large-scale operations against networks connected to online gambling, illegal payment processing and the movement of funds abroad.

In many investigations, the same factor appears repeatedly — Chinese nationals who, according to law-enforcement statements, were involved in organizing gambling networks and using local payment infrastructure.

This is not simply about creating betting websites.

It is about building an entire system that relies on:

• bKash, Nagad, Rocket and Upay accounts;
• bank accounts belonging to Bangladeshi citizens;
• thousands of SIM cards;
• payment agents;
• cryptocurrency channels.

According to investigators, foreign operators gain access to local financial tools and then use them to receive, move and transfer funds.

At the same time, the real organizers may remain outside Bangladesh, while local citizens become only the registered owners of accounts and SIM cards through which transactions are processed.

Over the past months, Bangladeshi police have reported the arrest of several groups involving Chinese nationals connected to online gambling networks and related financial activities.

Is Bangladesh Becoming Disposable Infrastructure for the Transnational Gambling Business?Over the past several months, l...
20/08/2026

Is Bangladesh Becoming Disposable Infrastructure for the Transnational Gambling Business?

Over the past several months, law-enforcement agencies in Bangladesh have uncovered a series of networks connected to online gambling, illegal payment processing, thousands of SIM cards, MFS accounts, and the movement of money abroad.

In several major cases, the same factor appears repeatedly: Chinese organizers and payment infrastructure controlled by Chinese nationals.

This is no longer just a matter of isolated illegal casino websites. A broader financial ecosystem is emerging in which local people in Bangladesh can become the lowest and most vulnerable layer of the chain.

How the system works

According to the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Detective Branch, online gambling operators collect from Bangladeshis:

• bKash, Nagad, Rocket and Upay MFS accounts
• bank accounts
• SIM cards
• MFS agent accounts
• access to local payment infrastructure

These accounts are then used to receive and move funds inside Bangladesh.

The money is subsequently consolidated, transferred to other accounts and converted into cryptocurrency. Police have described the use of Binance, Bybit and Bitget, after which cryptocurrency is sent to wallets provided by the operators running the scheme.

In other words, Bangladesh’s local financial infrastructure becomes the first layer of an international money-transfer system.

What can happen after control of an account is transferred

A separate danger is that once control over a bank or MFS account is handed to third parties, the actual account holder may no longer understand which financial chains the account is being used in.

Today, such an account may process payments connected to online gambling. Tomorrow, the same infrastructure — nominee accounts, SIM cards, cryptocurrency wallets and intermediary networks — used in other forms of illicit commerce, including schemes connected to smuggling, illegal trade and drug trafficking.

6,600 SIM cards in a single operation

On 16 July, the Detective Branch conducted operations in Gazipur and Cumilla.

Police seized:

6,600 MFS-linked SIM cards
another 67 SIM cards
more than 70 mobile phones
a laptop and other equipment

DB stated that several payment companies operating behind Bangladesh-focused gambling websites and applications were controlled by Chinese nationals.

According to investigators, they obtained MFS and bank accounts from Bangladeshis for domestic transactions, while the proceeds were later moved abroad through cryptocurrency.

Police identified a Chinese national known as Natan as the suspected mastermind of one network.

According to the preliminary estimate cited by DB, that particular operation was handling around Tk 5 crore per day.

Even more striking was the preliminary nationwide estimate given by police: online gambling platforms in Bangladesh may be processing approximately Tk 700–1,000 crore per day.

Police named payment companies

The payment companies mentioned in the police account included:

Go Pay
Lucky Pay
LQ Pay
XE Pay
Cool Pay

Police said that the network they had identified operated, among other channels, through Go Pay, and that its suspected boss was a Chinese national.

But this appears to be only the visible part of the market.

Other payment solutions targeting Bangladesh are also promoted in Chinese-language channels and marketplaces:

ChaoPaoPay / 超跑 — bKash and Nagad

TigerPay / 老虎支付 — Nagad, Rocket and bKash

AGBDT / 孟加拉源头支付 — bKash and Nagad

BANPAY / 孟加拉源頭支付 — a Bangladesh-focused payment solution

孟加拉支付网关-三方支付 — a Chinese-language integration provider for bKash, Nagad and Rocket

Some of these services openly market themselves to Chinese-speaking clients as payment infrastructure for high-risk or BC-related businesses.

The existence of a brand on a Chinese-language platform does not, by itself, prove that it participated in a specific criminal case. But the concentration of such offerings demonstrates that there is a specialized market built around access to Bangladesh’s MFS infrastructure.

Chinese networks have already been arrested inside Bangladesh

On 14 May, police in Uttara and Turag arrested nine people, including six Chinese nationals, in connection with an online gambling network. Payments were reportedly collected through bKash and Nagad, while funds were moved abroad, including to China.

In early August, another network was uncovered in Bashundhara Residential Area.

Four people were arrested, including three Chinese nationals.

Police seized:

• 14 laptops
• 16 smartphones
• more than 6,000 active SIM cards
• 20 VoIP gateway machines

Investigators said the Chinese nationals were running illegal VoIP operations and online-gambling infrastructure from inside Dhaka.

In that case, police reported alleged laundering of Tk 200–250 crore per month through the gambling network.

This is no longer something that can be explained as the activity of a handful of isolated agents.

The biggest problem: local people become infrastructure

For an international high-risk operator, a Bangladeshi citizen may not be needed as a real partner or employee.

What may be needed is simply:

a name
a SIM card
a bKash/Nagad/Rocket/Upay account
a bank account
a local registration
a payment-agent profile

The main money flow and operational control can exist much higher in the chain.

The most immediate consequences, however, remain in Bangladesh.

When banks, MFS providers or law-enforcement agencies detect suspicious activity, the account that gets frozen is registered to a local person. Their name appears in the bank or MFS records. Their SIM card was used for the transactions. They are the first person investigators can identify.

The organizer, meanwhile, may simply replace one SIM card with another, one account with another, and one local intermediary with the next.

The scale of this model is visible in the numbers: individual police operations have already uncovered 6,000–6,600 SIM cards connected to such networks.

Why are there so many different payment brands?

Go Pay today.

Another Pay tomorrow.

A new Telegram channel next month.

Another domain after the previous one is blocked.

For the high-risk payment industry, frequent changes in branding can be part of the survival model.

That is why investigators should not look only at the public name of a payment service. They should also examine the infrastructure behind it:

who provides the accounts

who collects the MFS numbers

who controls the Telegram groups

where the USDT ultimately goes

which cryptocurrency wallets appear repeatedly

which devices and IP addresses overlap

which local agents work with multiple brands

Different names do not necessarily mean different networks.

Behind dozens of small payment brands there may be overlapping technical operators, agents, infrastructure providers or larger organizers. This is exactly why investigations should follow common wallets, SIM cards, devices, transaction routes and ultimate beneficiaries — not only company names.

Bangladesh should not become a disposable payment hub

The most dangerous scenario is straightforward:

a foreign high-risk operation enters the market

it connects large numbers of accounts and SIM cards belonging to local citizens

it processes huge volumes of gambling transactions through them

the money is converted into cryptocurrency

the funds are moved abroad

after accounts or brands are blocked, they are replaced

and the legal and financial consequences remain in Bangladesh

This is why targeting individual gambling websites is not enough.

Authorities must identify the financial infrastructure that allows these platforms to accept money every day: MFS agents, bank accounts, payment companies, cryptocurrency wallets, technical operators and the ultimate organizers.

The recurring pattern is already visible across multiple investigations: collection of local MFS accounts and SIM cards, use of technical infrastructure, consolidation of funds, conversion into cryptocurrency and movement of money abroad.

Bangladesh has already intensified its fight against online gambling. The next critical step is ensuring that investigations do not stop with the local SIM-card owner or account holder, but reach those who create, finance and control the entire transnational payment chain.

Sources

Prothom Alo
https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime/2pv5388a73

The Daily Star
https://www.thedailystar.net/news/crime-justice/news/six-held-db-busts-alleged-online-gambling-network-4225381

BSS
https://www.bssnews.net/others/406214

BSS — arrest of six Chinese nationals
https://www.bssnews.net/others/386909

The Business Standard — Bashundhara case
https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/crime/four-arrested-over-online-gambling-network-laundering-tk250cr-month-1504421

IF YOUR MOBILE MONEY ACCOUNT HAS BEEN RESTRICTED AND YOU HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH GAMBLING OR HUNDI — WRITE TO US.We help...
19/08/2026

IF YOUR MOBILE MONEY ACCOUNT HAS BEEN RESTRICTED AND YOU HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH GAMBLING OR HUNDI — WRITE TO US.

We help citizens and honest businesses, free of charge, to work out what happened to their account and what to do next.

We are not a government body and we cannot lift a freeze. But we can help you identify what class of problem you actually have, gather the documents that matter, choose the correct complaint route — and make sure your case reaches the regulator.

WHAT WE DO

— We go through your situation and explain what class of problem you actually have: a KYC update request, a dispute over a recipient, a technical fault, or a compliance review.
— We help you assemble the documents a provider normally asks for: trade licence, invoices, sales history, an explanation of the source of funds.
— We tell you the correct complaint route and the order of steps, so you do not lose weeks writing to the wrong place.
— We include your case in an anonymised summary for Bangladesh Bank, the BFIU and the relevant parliamentary committee.

WHAT WE DO NOT DO

— We do not help anyone bypass a block.
— We do not work with anyone involved in gambling, hundi, or trading in other people's SIMs, NIDs and accounts. We turn those requests down.
— We take no money and we promise no one that we will "remove a flag". Anyone offering that for a fee is a fraudster.
— We do not publish your personal data.

WHAT TO SEND US

1. The date and time the restriction appeared.
2. The provider and the account type: personal, merchant or agent.
3. The exact wording of the message in the app or from customer care.
4. Your support ticket number and the date you raised it.
5. Whether you received a reply, and how many days have passed.
6. For a business: whether you hold a trade licence, and what year you started operating.

We do not publish personal data. We will hand an anonymised summary, together with our methodology, to Bangladesh Bank, the BFIU and the relevant parliamentary committee, so that this debate runs on figures rather than impressions.

BE CAREFUL: FRAUDSTERS WORK THIS TOPIC

Nobody can "remove a flag" from your account for money. bKash separately warns about calls from people posing as staff, using the line that your account has been blocked by mistake. A real employee never asks for your PIN or OTP.

The official complaint route is free: your provider's helpline first, then its complaint cell with your documents, then the Customer Interest Protection Centre of Bangladesh Bank on 16236.

bKash fraud warning:
[https://www.bkash.com/en/help/avoid-fraud](https://www.bkash.com/en/help/avoid-fraud)

THESE SITUATIONS ALREADY EXIST

Below are real messages from user groups, and one written reply from a bank. Every one of them is linked, so you can open the original and judge for yourself.

We do not present them as proof that these particular people were restricted by mistake. For most such messages it is impossible to establish either the date or the reason for the restriction. We present them because they show a repeating pattern: the person is never told the reason, and does not know where to go.

1. Group "bKash App Users of Bangladesh" — date not established

"My bcash account has been stoped automatically. I don't know why and how. I'm instructed to contact with customer care but surprisingly the call is not reaching…"

Three features at once: the stop was automatic, the reason was never given to the account holder, and support was unreachable.

Source:
[https://www.facebook.com/groups/bKashAppUsers/posts/752368401883135/](https://www.facebook.com/groups/bKashAppUsers/posts/752368401883135/)

2. Group "Bank Account And Card User Community Bangladesh" — date not established

"For several months, Bkash company has been blocking NPSB service in my account. Due to which I am not able to make BANGLA QR payment. When I contacted customer care, they said that this service in my…"

The restriction is narrow, it has lasted for months, and the account holder never got a clear explanation out of customer care.

Source:
[https://www.facebook.com/groups/bankaccountandbankcardbd/posts/1768143134053779/](https://www.facebook.com/groups/bankaccountandbankcardbd/posts/1768143134053779/)

3. Group "bKash App Users of Bangladesh" — a customer quoting the provider's own message, date not established

"সুস্পষ্ট অভিযোগের ভিত্তিতে আপনার বিকাশ একাউন্টটি সাময়িকভাবে বন্ধ করা হয়েছিল। এ বিষয়ে সুষ্ঠু অনুসন্ধানের ভিত্তিতে আপনার একাউন্টটি পার্মানেন্টলি বন্ধ করার সিন্ধান্ত নেয়া হয়েছে।"

Translation: "On the basis of a specific complaint your bKash account was temporarily closed. Following a proper inquiry into the matter, a decision has been taken to close your account permanently."

This is not an example of an error: an inquiry was in fact carried out. But the account holder is told neither who complained nor what about — and therefore cannot contest the decision.

Source:
[https://www.facebook.com/groups/bKashAppUsers/posts/1888150631638234/](https://www.facebook.com/groups/bKashAppUsers/posts/1888150631638234/)

4. A written reply from Eastern Bank Limited to a cardholder, March 2023

"As per our investigation we found that you are trying on a restricted merchant (Steam). This site provides Digital Media Games and that's why your transactions are being declined."

A lawful service ended up in a restricted category, and a law-abiding customer could not pay. The decisive detail: the payment failed on EBL and BRAC cards but went through on Standard Chartered, City Bank and Amex. So this is one institution's own configuration, not a requirement of law.

Source:
[https://www.reddit.com/r/bangladesh/comments/11xis6d/cannot_buy_games_from_steam/](https://www.reddit.com/r/bangladesh/comments/11xis6d/cannot_buy_games_from_steam/)

WHY WE ARE STARTING OUR OWN COLLECTION OF CASES

There are almost no verifiable, documented cases of honest businesses in the public domain. Searching for phrases like "account blocked" returns three entirely different categories: warnings about fraudulent calls, technical faults in the app, and deserved blocks of dishonest sellers following buyer complaints.

People who are restricted by mistake rarely write about it publicly. The absence of data suits everyone except those harmed — which is precisely why we are opening this collection.

THE LAW AND THE FIGURES, BRIEFLY

The law in force is জুয়া প্রতিরোধ আইন, ২০২৬ — the Gambling Prevention Act 2026, Act No. 98 of 2026. Parliament passed it unanimously on 30 June 2026, it took effect on 1 July, and it repealed the colonial-era Public Gambling Act 1867. Before the vote, proposals from eight lawmakers to open the bill to public opinion and further scrutiny were rejected, and so were the amendments tabled.

Full text of the Act:
[http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-print-1727.html](http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-print-1727.html)

THE FIGURES

Around 55,000 MFS accounts frozen — the Finance Minister in parliament, 24 June 2026.
[https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bfiu-freezes-55000-mfs-accounts-over-gambling-hundi-allegations-khosru-1471416](https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bfiu-freezes-55000-mfs-accounts-over-gambling-hundi-allegations-khosru-1471416)

Around 24,000 accounts in a single month — a senior BFIU official, 3 August 2026.
[https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bfiu-freeze-14000-more-mfs-accounts-over-online-gambling-hundi-links-1505811](https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bfiu-freeze-14000-more-mfs-accounts-over-online-gambling-hundi-links-1505811)

67.2 per cent — the share of cash in the value of all transactions in 2025.
[https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/bangladeshs-cashless-economy-ambition-faces-trust-deficit-1507636](https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/bangladeshs-cashless-economy-ambition-faces-trust-deficit-1507636)

We deliberately do not add the first two figures together. Nothing in the public record establishes whether they overlap, and no consolidated public total exists. What is certain is that the scale runs to several tens of thousands of accounts.

PENALTIES

Conventional offline gambling — up to 2 years or up to Tk 2 lakh.
Online or remote gambling, sections 5 and 16 — up to 5 years or up to Tk 1 crore.
Participation in online betting, sections 6 and 17 — up to 7 years or up to Tk 5 crore.
Gambling equipment and software, sections 8 and 19 — up to 3 years or up to Tk 10 lakh.
Fake SIMs, another person's NID or biometrics, sections 13 and 24 — up to 7 years or up to Tk 50 lakh.

THE SECTIONS THAT DEFINE THE SURVEILLANCE REGIME

Section 36 — search and seizure without prior court approval.
Sections 37 and 38 — blocking of apps, websites, servers and domains without judicial authorisation.
Section 39 — freezing of bank accounts, MFS accounts and wallets, with prior judicial approval.
Section 40 — a national digital blacklist database: NID, SIM, account, wallet, device, domain, IP.
Section 41 — the NID–SIM–MFS linking system, biometric verification, facial recognition.
Section 44 — AI Monitoring System, Deep Packet Inspection, Risk Scoring System, Transaction Monitoring System.

THE ONE THING TO UNDERSTAND ABOUT THE MECHANISM

The mass freezes are not carried out under this Act. Their legal basis is section 23(1)(c) of the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2012: an administrative procedure, no court required, for up to 30 days, extendable up to seven further times — that is, up to eight months in total. That is exactly why the measure scales to tens of thousands of accounts.

The BFIU described the procedure in its own words: "In the past month, we have frozen 10,000 MFS accounts. Based on a report submitted by an agency, we have decided to freeze another 14,000 accounts today. The process is already underway."

This is freezing in batches against lists handed over by an agency, not an individual decision on each account. And that is also why someone whose number ended up on a list by accident can be caught by it.

WHAT THOSE IN AUTHORITY HAVE SAID

We are not opening a new subject. The question of there being no route of appeal for those affected was raised in parliament itself on the day the Act was passed, and has since been repeated by judges, Supreme Court lawyers and specialist organisations.

IN PARLIAMENT, 30 JUNE 2026

"The bill does not appear to provide adequate avenues for those affected to seek judicial remedy or challenge such actions before a court."
— Akhter Hossain, Member of Parliament for Rangpur-4, NCP

"The bill contains several positive measures to tackle online gambling. However, some of its provisions are controversial and leave considerable room for misuse."
— Akhter Hossain, Member of Parliament for Rangpur-4, NCP

Section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows police to seize property without prior court approval, but requires officers to inform a magistrate immediately afterwards and obtain the necessary authorisation. The new law does not even require them to seek that authorisation afterwards.
— Nazibur Rahman, Member of Parliament for Pabna-1, who called the Act timely legislation

"However, the proposed act contains certain loopholes and provisions that require further review and discussions."
— Nahid Islam, Opposition Chief Whip, NCP

"By the time court permission is obtained, there is a strong possibility that the location and evidence of the offence will have disappeared."
— Salahuddin Ahmed, Home Affairs Minister, responding to the objections to section 36

Parliamentary debate reported here:
[https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/gambling-prevention-bill-passed-police-can-now-search-seize-evidence-without-prior-court](https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/gambling-prevention-bill-passed-police-can-now-search-seize-evidence-without-prior-court)

JUDGES AND LAWYERS

"The Act makes no room for an aggrieved person to challenge the actions. The lack of independent oversight or an appeals mechanism raises severe due process concerns."
— Md. Ziaur Rahman, District and Sessions Judge, Bangladesh Judicial Service, in his legal analysis of the Act, Bangladesh Law Digest, 8 August 2026

"Using artificial intelligence can cause algorithmic mistakes, bias, or random results. AI should function solely as a decision-support tool under human supervision."
— Md. Ziaur Rahman, on the use of artificial intelligence under section 44

"The Act does not specify criteria for inclusion in the database, the length of time information can be retained, or the process for review and removal. This results in people or entities being listed without sufficient notice or meaningful opportunity to challenge their listing."
— Md. Ziaur Rahman, on the blacklist under section 40

Full legal analysis:
[https://bdlawdigest.org/gambling-prevention-act-2026-analysis.html](https://bdlawdigest.org/gambling-prevention-act-2026-analysis.html)

"Privacy is an individual's constitutional right. Therefore, such activities are not in accordance with either the constitution or the law. This is not a mere procedural formality but a fundamental safeguard of individual freedom."
— Moshiur Rahman, Supreme Court lawyer

"Any exercise of power must be reasonable, justified, and subject to legal scrutiny. Searching mobile phones or individuals without proper grounds or authorisation constitutes a serious breach of personal privacy and is unlawful."
— Mohammad Soaliman Tushar, Supreme Court lawyer

"It is crucial to balance security measures with the protection of individual freedoms, ensuring that privacy rights are not compromised in the process."
— Abdullah-Al-Monzur Hussain, Professor of Law, Dhaka International University

Lawyers and constitutional concerns reported here:
[https://www.dhakastream.net/bangladesh/new-anti-gambling-law-could-undermine-right-privacy-196512](https://www.dhakastream.net/bangladesh/new-anti-gambling-law-could-undermine-right-privacy-196512)

EXPERTS, OPERATORS AND ANALYSTS

Preventing gambling and betting offences is undoubtedly necessary. But room has been left to curtail the fundamental rights of users of digital devices on the basis of an authorised officer's belief, with no safeguards and no accountability.
— Iftekharuzzaman, Executive Director, Transparency International Bangladesh, translated from Bengali

Across the world, human interaction is what is being built into AI systems. There is no scope for trusting artificial intelligence alone. And in special circumstances it is the state itself that curtails citizens' rights — so who will keep the state under watch?
— B. M. Moinul Hossain, Director, Institute of Information Technology, University of Dhaka, translated from Bengali

Both quoted here:
[https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/azags1vc5w](https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/azags1vc5w)

"For send-money or person-to-person transactions, neither Nagad nor anyone else can know the transaction's true purpose."
— Muhammad Zahidul Islam, Head of Media and Communication, Nagad
[https://www.tbsnews.net/economy/banking/bb-orders-mfs-providers-stop-online-gambling-transactions-1276586](https://www.tbsnews.net/economy/banking/bb-orders-mfs-providers-stop-online-gambling-transactions-1276586)

"For a low-income demographic or a micro-merchant, the acute lack of agile consumer protection makes paper currency their only reliable defence mechanism against both systemic friction and financial ruin. If the central bank and MFS providers cannot technologically guarantee that a defrauded user's money will be restored within hours rather than months, the public will never abandon the safety of physical cash."
— Asif Shahriyar Sushmit, policy analyst, former consultant to the ICT Division

WHY THIS IS AN ECONOMIC QUESTION, NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF FAIRNESS

Bangladesh aims to become a cashless economy by 2031. In 2025, cash accounted for 67.2 per cent of the value of all transactions and digital payments for only 32.8 per cent. The informal sector is 80 to 85 per cent of the workforce and, by various estimates, between 30 and 43 per cent of GDP — and it runs almost entirely on cash. The state meanwhile spends in the order of Tk 20,000 to 22,000 crore a year printing and handling currency.

Hence our central economic argument. Every mistaken freeze without a fast and comprehensible review works against the very purpose of enforcement. It does not merely ruin one shop — it pushes people and small traders back into cash and into the informal channels, hundi included, that the Act was written to close. A small business with no digital transaction history also loses access to formal credit, because banks have nothing on which to assess it.

Trust here is not an abstract value. It is a condition for the financial security system to work at all.

THE UNFREEZING MECHANISM ALREADY PARTLY EXISTS — IT NEEDS TO BE SWITCHED ON

We are not asking anyone to invent a procedure from scratch. The concept of a false positive, and the procedure for lifting a freeze, are already defined in Bangladesh's subordinate legislation. In the Anti-Terrorism Rules 2013, rule 2(c) defines a false positive as a freeze that further inquiry shows to be unwarranted, and rule 3(h) gives the BFIU authority to withdraw it on the application of the aggrieved person.

But the construction is defective. The review committee is formed at discretion rather than as a standing body. There is no published procedure and no outer time limit. The burden of proving non-involvement rests on the person harmed. An application for reconsideration may be filed only once. And where the freeze was imposed at the request of another government agency, withdrawing it requires the agreement of the very agency that drew up the list.

Anti-Terrorism Rules 2013, official gazette:
[https://www.dpp.gov.bd/upload_file/gazettes/6765_50180.pdf](https://www.dpp.gov.bd/upload_file/gazettes/6765_50180.pdf)

OUR PROPOSALS

To the Government, Bangladesh Bank, the BFIU and the relevant parliamentary committee.

1. KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE ORGANISERS, NOT ON SMALL TRADERS
The priority should be master and super agents, the payment layers servicing betting operations, and the channels moving money out through cryptocurrency and hundi. That is where the damage is concentrated.

2. MAKE THE FALSE POSITIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE MANDATORY
The rules currently say the BFIU "may" form a committee of at least three members not below the rank of Deputy Director. It should read "shall", with a published procedure, a single intake channel for applications and an outer time limit. We propose 15 working days, by analogy with the limit already in force under the Anti-Terrorism Rules 2013.

3. REQUIRE HUMAN REVIEW BEFORE A FREEZE
Where an account's indicators match the profile of a micro-business — a trade licence, a sales history, KYC in order — a human being should confirm the decision. Judge Ziaur Rahman's formulation is exact: AI should function solely as a decision-support tool under human supervision.

4. RECORD A SPECIFIC GROUND, NOT A "SUSPICION"
In the case on arrests without warrant, the High Court issued 15 directives in 2003, which the Appellate Division upheld with modifications in April 2016: suspicion alone is not enough, and the officer must record specific reasons in the station diary. The same standard should apply to freezing an account, instead of a reference to a number appearing on a list.

5. TELL THE ACCOUNT HOLDER THE CLASS OF GROUND
A person must be able to understand what has happened: a KYC update request, a dispute over a recipient, a technical block, or a compliance review. Without knowing the class of the problem, they physically cannot defend themselves.

6. MAKE THE RULES UNDER SECTION 40 BEFORE SCALING THE BLACKLIST
Criteria for inclusion, a data retention period, mandatory notification and a removal procedure. Otherwise a bar on opening accounts against a flagged NID becomes an indefinite loss of rights with no court decision behind it.

7. PUBLISH THE STATISTICS
How many accounts have been frozen, how many unfrozen, how many applications were accepted as false positives, and what the average processing time is. Section 47 of the Act expressly empowers the Government to publish statistics and reports. Open statistics on error strengthen confidence in enforcement rather than undermining it.

8. SEPARATE THE FLOWS TECHNICALLY
Give micro-businesses a simple, cheap merchant product, so that lawful trade stops looking like the collection of bets. A micro-merchant in Bangladesh today pays a merchant discount rate of around 1 per cent; in several countries that rate is zero for this category or is subsidised by the regulator.

IN CLOSING

Firm action against illegal gambling and protection for law-abiding citizens and businesses are not alternatives to choose between. They are two parts of one task.

A financial security system that cannot recognise and correct its own errors quickly loses its most important asset: the trust of the public. And without trust, money moves to where there is no supervision at all — which is precisely where the Act is trying to move it away from.

We are ready for dialogue and for professional work with the regulator.

Bangladesh Civil Security Network

Address

Dhaka

Website

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